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This article explores how the Brexit Referendum on the UK’s membership of the 
European Union has been a source of destabilisation, dread and ontological 
anxiety. Focusing mainly on British citizens who voted or self-identified as 
‘Remainers’, and on EU foreign nationals resident in the UK, it shows how 
existential anxieties have had different points of focus for different groups of 
people. Confronted with such destabilising anxieties, the article shows how people 
have adopted different mechanisms designed to reassert a sense of order and 
certitude often viewed as central to preserving ontological security. The ways in 
which this has been done, however, can themselves raise important questions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
“I’m a British Mummy, he is a Polish Daddy, and this is our little baby European.” 
(cited at Neild and Masters 2016) 
 
 
On the 23rd June 2016 the United Kingdom (UK) held its advisory referendum on whether the 
country should seek to leave the European Union (EU), the shorthand of which has become 
known as the Brexit referendum. By the morning of the 24th the result had been declared, 
with 51.9% voting in favour of leaving and 48.1% voting against. The country was – and 
remains – divided on the issue.1 This split, however, is not just a matter of political differences, 
but has, from the beginning, exhibited deep emotional, psychological and even existential 
elements. For many of the victors – the leavers, the Brexiteers – the result was greeted with 
joy and euphoria.2 For many of them the vote signalled ‘getting our country back (from 
Brussels)’, reclaiming freedom, sovereignty and control, and the chance to make ‘Britain great 
again’, all sentiments that had characterised the Leave campaign’s sloganeering and that 
continue to shape much of the popular political discourse on the Brexit negotiations that 
officially began in March 2017.  
 
For many of ‘the 48%’ – the Remainers – but also for many non-national residents ineligible 
to vote3 but strongly in favour of Britain’s continued EU membership, the result provoked a 
different outpouring of emotions – including disillusion, anguish, fear, anxiety, betrayal, anger 
and despair. Indeed, for many Remainers the world appeared to have been turned upside 
down… or worse. As Toni Carlton, a childminder from London, told CNN: ‘It felt like the world 
was ending right there. It sounds dramatic, but I just felt like burying my head in the pillow 
and screaming’ (quoted in Neild and Masters 2016). Carlton’s reaction expressed the feeling, 
the anxiety, that the world, her world, was fundamentally transforming, that key markers of 
                                                          
1 This is partly because ‘the 52%’, as it has become known, comprised only c.37% of registered voters and 
c.26% of the country’s population (The Electoral Commission n/d). 
2 But not all. Some Leave voters also found the result shocking, not least because they did not expect Leave to 
win and were often not voting about the EU as such, but rather lodging a more general protest vote. 
3 Including c.3.3 million EU non-nationals (Low 2017). 
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stability and everyday assumptions that provide individuals with a sense of surety, were being 
destabilised.  
 
Likewise, the day following the referendum, Abbey Urbanski, an Englishwoman from York, 
posted a family picture on Instagram. As she stated, ‘I’m a British Mummy, he is a Polish 
Daddy, and this is our baby European’. Encapsulated in this was not simply a statement of 
fact, but also an expression of anxiety, of feeling ‘numb… and at a loss as to what the future 
holds for our little family unit’ (quoted in Neild and Masters 2016). This is a feeling that has 
been shared by many Remainers who, whether with respect to their immediate family, or 
their broader senses of social and collective identity, also feel numb, anxious and a sense of 
loss. Unlike for many Brexiteers, who see a future of opportunities and new horizons (at least 
for now), most Remainers see the future in much less open and inviting terms.   
 
Drawing on the ontological (in)security literature in International Relations this article focuses 
on Brexit as a source of destabilisation, dread and ontological anxiety primarily for those 
people who ‘lost’ the referendum. For these people Brexit has been experienced as a ‘critical 
situation’ (Giddens 1991) fundamentally destabilising and challenging established 
worldviews, routines and core conceptions of selfhood, and not least, notions of societal 
trust, a source of anxiety that goes beyond more rationalist concerns about the economic and 
political consequences of Brexit.4 In doing so it also contributes to the growing emphasis in 
the discipline on manifestations of the international in the politics of the everyday – in this 
case of people’s everyday family, social and working lives – while in turn emphasising how 
such everyday politics can have potentially broader political implications.  
 
The article begins by briefly discussing the literature on ontological security, paying particular 
attention to several mechanisms through which ontological security is generated. In 
particular, emphasis is placed on the role of biographical narratives of self-identity, the 
routinisation of everyday practices, the importance of recognition and shame dynamics, 
                                                          
4 Importantly, as the post-referendum period has unfolded existential anxieties have also increased markedly 
amongst Brexiteers. There are various explanations for this including: fears that Brexit is being sold out, unease 
at accusations of racism levelled against Leavers, the messy nature of the process and the realisation that 
Brexit is unlikely to provide the fulfilment desired. This paper focuses on Remainers for reasons of space, while 
the anxieties of Leave voters have been tackled in a partner paper (Browning under review). 
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vicarious identification with a larger community, the role of home and family in establishing 
a sense of sanctuary, and temptations towards the securitisation of existential anxieties into 
tangible objects of fear and blame. The article then analyses how Brexit has generated a range 
of different anxieties, principally amongst Remainers, and does so by breaking Remainers 
down into two key groups: British citizens and European residents. 
 
 
Ontological Security 
 
Discussions of ontological security start from the premise that existential anxieties are 
embedded in the very condition of human existence and are driven by awareness of our 
possible nonbeing (Tillich 2014, p. 38; also, Heidegger 2010; Kierkegaard 1980; Giddens 1991; 
Laing 1969). These anxieties are always with us, a background condition that may be both 
generative of action and possibility, an invocation to make the most of our lives (e.g. 
Heidegger 2010; Inwood 2000), but which can also be potentially overwhelming, generating 
a sense of paralysis and despair.  
 
Tillich (2014, pp. 41-2, 45) argues existential anxieties come in three forms. The first concerns 
anxieties of fate and death and relate to awareness that our temporal and physical existence 
is inherently contingent and which drives subjects to locate themselves in time and space as 
a counter to the ever present threat of non-existence. When the temporal and spatial being 
of subjects is challenged such anxieties can therefore be activated. The second concerns 
anxieties of emptiness and meaninglessness. This concerns man’s need for ‘spiritual self-
affirmation’ through the upholding of cosmological systems of meaning that, however 
symbolic or indirect, provide answers ‘to the question of the meaning of existence’. Such 
systems provide a sense of ‘ultimate concern… a meaning which gives meaning to all 
meanings’ (Tillich 2014, p. 45). Existential anxieties emerge whenever the anchors of 
established belief systems break down, either as result of ‘external events or inner processes’, 
with this potentially generating anxieties of separation and estrangement from the world and 
a despair and doubt in truth and the nature of reality (Tillich 2014, pp. 45-6). Third, there are 
anxieties of guilt and condemnation, which concern people’s need to feel a sense of purpose, 
destiny and moral self-affirmation. People, Tillich (2014, pp. 48-9) argues, are required to 
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answer for what they have made of themselves and to live up to their sense of moral being. 
This can leave individuals susceptible to anxieties of (self-)rejection, condemnation and 
shame, of feeling lost and estranged from themselves and their destiny, particularly when 
subject to criticism from others (also see Rumelili 2015, p. 12). Tillich (2014, pp. 53-8) argues 
that while all three forms of anxiety are always present and deeply interconnected their 
relative importance in different contexts changes. In the context of Brexit, it is arguably 
anxieties of emptiness and meaninglessness and of guilt and condemnation that have been 
most apparent, while questions of fate and death have been largely absent. 
  
Taking the existence of such background anxieties as a fundamental part of the human 
condition, the ontological security literature has focused on how individuals and collectives 
manage to cope with and ‘bracket out’ such anxieties, thereby enabling us to ‘go on’ with 
everyday life without being overwhelmed and drifting into melancholic or psychotic states 
(Giddens 1991, pp. 35-42). This requires individuals to establish a sense of ‘basic trust’ in other 
persons and the nature of reality, and where such trust provides ‘a sort of emotional 
inoculation against existential anxieties’ (original emphasis Giddens 1991, p. 39; Kinnvall et al 
this volume). A focus on ontological security therefore requires emphasising the extent to 
which individuals are socially embedded, not simply seeking to try ‘to secure the coherence 
of self, but rather the coherence and stability of their broader social context’ (original 
emphasis Pratt 2017, p. 81; Croft 2012, p. 23). This also means seeking to secure the various 
sets of collective signifiers (e.g. national identity) with which they identify and that in turn 
provide a basis for agency.5  
 
As indicated, to cope with existential anxieties of fate and death, emptiness and 
meaninglessness and of guilt and condemnation, it is imperative for people to anchor 
themselves in space and time and to establish cognitive frameworks of cosmic meaning about 
the nature of their salient world, their role within it and their direction of travel. This can be 
achieved via a variety of interconnected and reinforcing mechanisms and practices, with six 
                                                          
5 This therefore avoids debates about the validity of scaling up ontological security from the individual to the 
collective level (e.g. Croft 2012, pp. 29-32; Krolikowski 2008; Mitzen 2006, p. 352; Steele 2008, pp. 15-20), a 
debate that arguably misses the fact that discourse and subjects are not ontologically separate realms and that 
as such people have different identities at different levels of generalisation (Solomon 2015, p. 63). 
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noted here that have been particularly evident in the post-referendum context. Since 
ontological security enhancement is, for the most part, a largely reflexive, instinctive and 
somewhat sub/unconscious activity it is often only when it becomes challenged that such 
ontological security seeking practices can be identified and seen for what they are.  It is the 
destabilisation of such mechanisms that the Brexit vote has exposed. 
 
First, there is widespread agreement that a prerequisite for establishing a sense of ontological 
security is the generation of a biographical narrative of self-identity that locates the self in a 
particular time and place and in regard to other significant identities and actors. This, as Steele 
(2008, pp. 10-12) notes, helps individuals establish a sense of the nature of their salient 
environment, providing a cognitive framework through which everyday events, interactions 
and relationships can be comprehended, ordered and processed. In general, it is believed that 
maintaining stability and consistency in one’s self-identity narratives is central to enhancing 
the sense of ontological security, whereas fractured, unclear or inconsistent biographical 
narratives may foster anxiety (Solomon 2017). 
 
Second, it is argued that ontological security is also often enhanced through the routinisation 
of everyday practices (Giddens 1991, pp. 39-41). Such routines will often be mundane, but no 
less important for that. For instance, getting up at a set time Monday-Friday, dropping one’s 
children off at school, checking one’s email and preparing lectures are all fundamental, not 
only in carrying out one’s responsibilities as a parent and lecturer, but also in reaffirming the 
very sense of identity and purpose one derives from those identifications. Moreover, during 
crises mundane everyday routines can quickly become deeply significant, ontologically and 
politically. For example, following the Paris terrorist attack in November 2015 everyday 
routines like drinking coffee in bars and cafes gained a deep sense of ontological significance, 
recast as a resolute act of resistance and as a civilizational statement and marker of French 
identity and values – all encapsulated in the popularised social media meme ‘Je suis en 
terrasse’ (Browning 2018). 
 
Third, Steele (2005) has argued that actors will seek to avoid actions that might potentially 
generate condemnation and shame at failing to live up to whom one claims to be. This relates 
to Tillich’s (2014, pp. 48-9) concern with anxieties of guilt and condemnation, which he argues 
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plays on our understanding of humans as moral beings responsible to ourselves and to others 
(and God) for our actions. Steele (2005), however, adds a further political dimension to this, 
noting how shaming tactics can be used to activate such self-condemnatory existential 
anxieties in others in order to push preferred political agendas. The denial of recognition for 
whom one claims to be can be deeply distressing, and in the case analysis appears in various 
forms. 
 
Fourth, individuals often generate a sense of ontological security through vicariously 
identifying with broader communities – e.g. nations (Kinnvall 2004, pp. 742-4; Marlow 2002, 
p. 247; Krolikowski 2008; Browning 2018). Vicarious identification entails ‘living through’ the 
experiences and achievements of others, appropriating them as if they happened to oneself 
(Goldstein and Cialdini 2007). Vicarious identification can perform at least two ontological 
security enhancing functions. First, and particularly evident with national communities – 
where the nation is often anthropomorphised as a living independent being – it can help salve 
anxieties about fate and death by establishing an illusion of immortality by proxy 
(Berenskoetter 2010). Second, it can also enhance the individual’s sense of self-esteem, 
compensate for their own failings and thereby ward off anxieties of guilt and condemnation, 
by enabling the individual to internalise the community’s collective achievements. Of course, 
this also means that vicarious identification can potentially backfire, especially in situations 
(like Brexit for many Remainers) when the collective acts in unexpected, undesirable and what 
are felt to be ‘shameful’ ways.  
 
Fifth, it is argued that existential anxieties about the unknown are frequently refracted onto 
tangible objects of fear that can be prepared for or countered in some way (Rumelili 2015, p. 
14; Croft 2012). As Tillich (2014, pp. 35-7) argues in respect of death, people have a tendency 
not to dwell on the condition of actual non-existence, finding the prospect of the unknown 
and the threat of nothingness unbearable and a source of deep dread. Such thoughts are 
instead typically shifted onto possible causes of death – something which can be prepared for 
and met with courage (Tillich 2014, pp. 35-7). Anxieties about guilt and condemnation or 
about emptiness and meaninglessness can be met likewise. In particular, within international 
politics emerging anxieties about a collective’s (e.g. a nation’s) identity, standing and role are 
often redirected away from a self-reflective analysis of the community’s own shortcomings in 
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favour of sanctifying essentialised claims about self-identity while simultaneously identifying 
and securitising those others (enemies) that are seen to be putting the self in question 
(Kinnvall 2004; Mitzen 2006; Malksoo 2015). In short, those others who can be tangibly 
identified, feared and blamed. 
 
Lastly, individuals will also seek to generate a sense of ontological security through the 
cultivation of a particular place and set of (typically family) relationships as representing 
‘home’ (Dupuis and Thorns 1998; Kinnvall et al this volume). Like vicarious identification, 
‘home’ can offer an ‘aura of permanence’ (Heath-Kelly 2016), but more particularly can be 
viewed as an idealised sanctuary and ‘site of constancy in the social and material 
environment… a secure base on which identities are constructed’ (Kinnvall 2004, p. 747). 
Home is therefore typically idealised as a place of roots and grounding, a place of 
unquestioned acceptance that you can always return to, a place of safety and certitude in an 
uncertain world. However, when home is ‘lost’, or when one no longer feels welcome in one’s 
home or is told to leave, feelings of betrayal and dread can quickly follow. 
 
Importantly, these six ontological security enhancing mechanisms are closely interwoven. For 
instance, processes of vicarious identification are clearly deeply embedded within 
biographical narratives of self-identity, as are notions of home and family and practices of 
securitisation. Similarly, routines often exist as further manifestations of these aspects, not 
just reflecting them, but reproducing them into the future. However, while such mechanisms 
can help provide for a sense of ontological security that brackets out key questions about 
identity and meaning, they can also be disrupted by ‘critical situations’, which Giddens (1984, 
p. 61) defines as: ‘circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect 
substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of 
institutionalized routines’. As Croft (2012, p. 25) notes, critical situations are as such social 
crises that challenge ‘established beliefs and ways of doings things…[and]… emphasize the 
fragility of ontologically secure entities’ precisely because they disrupt everyday routines, 
identities, trust structures and the sense of social stability (also Pratt 2017, p. 81). When this 
happens subjects are required to reflexively respond by re-instantiating or adapting routines 
and self-identity narratives in processes that are often fraught with anxiety. 
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In the following, evidence for the above sets of discourses, sentiments and practices has been 
sought through focusing on first person pronouncements reported in mainstream media 
articles and interviews or posted on social media, since these constitute one of the only ways 
to identify people’s feelings at specific moments in time, and in particular with respect to how 
people experienced Brexit in the immediate days and weeks after the vote. Saying this, while 
most of the empirical material consulted dates to the immediate days and weeks following 
the referendum, later material is also used to highlight how the ontologically destabilising 
effects of Brexit have been enduring. The ontological anxieties of Brexit are therefore not 
superficial and (writing almost two years after the referendum) many Remainers are still to 
‘get over it’ or remain unable to ‘move on’ as Leave-camp supporters often suggest they 
should. 
 
Through such sources we can identify how the Brexit referendum raised (and continues to 
raise) challenges with respect to people’s biographical narratives of self-identity, their 
relationships with the idea of ‘home’ and with different broader communities of vicarious 
identification. We can also see how Brexit has generated a range of emotions, amongst which 
feelings of betrayal and shame are particularly notable, and which in turn has resulted in 
tendencies towards securitisation. Last, we can also see how Brexit has resulted in people 
changing or questioning established everyday routines, bringing home to them how such 
previously taken for granted practices have provided a sense of ontological security that many 
now experience as fragile. 
 
 
Case Analysis 
 
Turning to the case analysis Brexit appears (and has been constructed) as just one such 
‘critical situation’ generating widespread feelings of ontological anxiety and insecurity 
amongst Remainers, beyond more rationalist interest-based concerns about possible lost 
economic, educational and travel opportunities. Rather than the confident projections of a 
future free from Europe’s shackles and of reclaimed sovereignty and control that 
characterised many in the Leave camp, Remainers have tended to experience Brexit as 
generating deep levels of uncertainty and destabilisation at both an individual and collective 
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level. Routines have been destabilised while established attachments, identities and notions 
of social trust have been fundamentally challenged. Certainly, some of the anguish and 
strength of feeling experienced amongst Remainers resulted from the largely unexpected – 
and therefore (for them) doubly-shocking – nature of the result, something few 
commentators or pollsters (or even Leave campaign leaders) anticipated. However, these 
concerns have affected different groups of people differently, with different sets of 
ontological anxieties being activated. Most broadly we can distinguish between British 
citizens and European residents, though these groups can also be sub-divided in various ways. 
However, all such distinctions should be treated cautiously, as should any claim to suggest 
that people in one group necessarily experienced things one way rather than another. Even 
so, trends can still be identified since because of different legal, material and attributional 
factors Brexit has tended to emphasise different sorts of questions for different sets of 
people. 
 
British Citizens 
 
It is useful to start with Remainers who are British citizens, many of whom were eligible to 
vote in the referendum, but not all. For instance, people under the age of 18 were not allowed 
to vote, in contrast to the referendum on Scottish independence where 16-18 year olds were 
enfranchised. This has resulted in considerable feeling amongst younger generations – who 
were significantly in favour of Remain as a group (75% of under 24 year olds according to a 
YouGov poll – Goulard 2016) – that they have been sold out by older voters (Cresci 2016). 
Setting that aside for now a number of more general observations might be made about the 
nature of the ontological anxieties raised amongst Remainers by the Brexit vote. 
 
First, one of the most tangible reactions immediately after the vote, and one emphasising the 
extent to which the vote has been experienced as a ‘critical situation’ in the Giddensian sense, 
was a deep sense of shock. As noted above, for one Remainer it was like waking up and finding 
that ‘the world was ending’. For many this was accompanied by a deep sense of loss, with 
people feeling ‘sad’ (BBC 24 June 2016) and ‘heartbroken’ (Icklenellierose 2016). For some 
the vote was greeted like a bereavement to be grieved and mourned (Cyprus Mail 2016; 
Matthews 2016). Tangible in these sentiments was the feeling that the ‘future… [was being]… 
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taken away’ (Cresci 2016). In this respect, Brexit unleashed anxieties of emptiness and 
meaninglessness, challenging established cosmological views (Spicer 2016). More specifically, 
this grief and sense of loss was linked to questions of being, therefore challenging people’s 
biographical narratives of self-identity. The following interventions are indicative. 
 
‘It’s absolutely ridiculous’, said a civil servant. ‘I cannot believe we’ve gone out. I’m an 
entrenched European, my girlfriend’s German, my car is German, it’s ridiculous’ (BBC 24 June 
2016). 
 
‘Those of us for whom being in the European Union was an important part of our identity now 
feel like strangers in a strange land’ (“Thunderbay” in comments section of Frostrup 2016). 
 
The first comment parallels that of Abbey Urbanski in the Introduction, but in all instances 
there is a sense of losing a core element of self-hood. Brexit is experienced as taking 
something away that, whether previously consciously realised or not, was now held dear and 
as fundamental to people’s sense of who they are. Indeed, this sense of Brexit signalling the 
stripping away of European aspects of British identity existed despite the Leave campaign’s 
insistence that leaving the EU did not make Britain and Britons any less European. By contrast, 
insofar as the opposite has been felt it indicates precisely how EU membership – and the 
status of EU citizenship it affords – has become equated with being European.  
 
It is also evident, therefore, that for many Remainers the EU had become (or became in the 
context of the referendum) a source of vicarious identification. Trying to capture her sense of 
heartbreak, the video blogger ‘Icklenellierose’ (2016), therefore emphasised how EU 
membership meant ‘not just being our own little island, separate from everything else. [But] 
Feeling like you belong to a wider community’. Others expressed this by listing and reflecting 
on the ‘European project’s’ longer term achievements (e.g. Ramgobin 2016), which in future 
could no longer be appropriated as our own, but where a sense of shame also pervaded at 
having potentially jeopardised them for the future. Indeed, many Remainers have felt 
impelled to express remorse and apologise to fellow Europeans, indicating that anxieties of 
guilt and condemnation were also activated along with those of emptiness and 
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meaninglessness (e.g. “Greatbearlake” in comments section of Silverstone and Williams 
2016). 
 
Not everyone, however, has been willing to accept this loss of European identity – as 
expressed through EU membership – lying down. For instance, otherwise apparently 
mundane routines and symbols have become the focus of considerable attention. One 
example concerns the ‘burgundy’ British passport, presently symbolic of both British and 
European citizenship, but which for Leave campaigners, like UKIP on/off leader Nigel Farage, 
has been more specifically symbolic of Britain’s subjugation to Europe and of Britain’s open 
borders to European migrants. Whilst campaigning Farage often flourished his ‘Europeanised’ 
passport to signify that getting Britain back would mean returning to an exclusively British 
passport (Farage 2016; BBC 16 September 2016). Since the referendum the British passport’s 
future pigmentation has thus been raised as a symbolic issue, with Brexiteers wanting a return 
to the blue of previous years to clearly mark the break with Europe, and where associated 
feelings of sovereignty, independence and control can be activated in future at the level of 
individual practice whenever one approaches passport control (Mortimer 2016). Remainers, 
of course, do not wish to lose the European British passport and what it symbolises and 
enables. Significantly, since Brexit tens of thousands of British nationals have applied for dual 
citizenship in various EU countries – Ireland a particular favourite6 – with this indicative of 
attempts to preserve an established ‘European’ sense of ‘home’. While this does not entail 
giving up British citizenship, it does mean holding on to European citizenship as well. Others, 
however, have gone further with spikes noted on search engines with respect to emigrating 
from mainland Britain to countries in the EU or places like Gibraltar and Canada; i.e. 
Remainers seeking out ‘new homes’ (CBS News 24 June 2016). 
 
However, for many Remainers Brexit has not only destabilised biographical narratives of self-
identity connected to one’s sense of belonging to Europe, it has also resulted in significant 
anxieties about that identity which the Leave camp claims Brexit is reclaiming – the idea of 
Britishness. While it might be assumed that most British citizens (Remainers or Leavers) would 
still feel secure in their Britishness, this has not been so. Indeed, as indicated in the second of 
                                                          
6 Applications for Irish passports were up 106% on the year before by November 2016 (Marsh 2017a). 
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the indented quotes above, Brexit was also accompanied by a sense of alienation for many, 
of ‘feeling like strangers in a strange land’. For some Remainers home no longer feels like 
home at all. There are various elements and manifestations of this, while it arguably affects 
different groups in different ways. 
 
At a general level confusion is evident amongst Remainers that the Britain they thought 
existed was nothing but an illusion. This is often expressed in terms of a country that they 
thought believed in ‘unity and friendship’ as the way forward for everyone transforming in 
the face of isolationism and narrow self-interest, with anticipated worrying effects. 36 year-
old Londoner Carrie Dunn, for instance, admitted to being ‘terrified for the future’ and fully 
expected the UK to break up in due course (quoted in Neild and Masters 2016) – a concern 
given credence with the Scottish Nationalist Party’s calls for a second referendum on Scottish 
independence. 
 
However, many Remainers also see a much darker side to the Brexit vote, one that activates 
– at least as much as the sense of shame at letting Europe down does – anxieties of guilt and 
condemnation and generates feelings of deep unease and shame about what sort of 
constitutive values Brexit is seen to have unleashed and legitimised. A Britain previously 
hailed as ‘a home for Enlightenment values’ (Hutton 2017) is instead depicted as ‘returned to 
the Dark Ages of ignorance and hatred’ (Cliff James quoted in Dearden 2017). Remainers’ 
sense of alienation from this Britain is perhaps best captured in responses to UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage’s speech shortly after the referendum result was called, which he declared to be ‘a 
victory for real people. A victory for ordinary people. A victory for decent people’ (The 
Guardian 24 June 2016). As @Jenni_Bird1 reacted, ‘A victory “for real people” says Farage. 
Oh. I didn’t realise I don’t exist. #EUref’ (Specia and O’Neill 2016).  
 
Framed this way many Remainers have experienced Brexit and its aftermath as 
problematically divisive and an attempt to deprive them of a say on Britain’s future relations 
with the EU, a sentiment captured in frustrations at generic proclamations by the Leave 
campaign and the post-Brexit UK government that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and that ‘the British 
people have spoken/the will of the people is clear’, with Brexit increasingly depicted in terms 
of a ‘hard Brexit’ leaving the UK outside of both the Single Market and the EU’s free trade 
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area. For many Remainers statements like Farage’s have been understood as a direct attack 
that depicts Remainers as members of an almost traitorous and undemocratic liberal 
metropolitan elite divorced from the concerns of ‘real, ordinary and decent’ people. It also 
comes on the back of a continuing populist rejection of ‘experts’ and ‘expertise’, suggesting a 
more general breakdown in societal trust structures (compare with Krahmann in this volume 
– Steele draft).  
 
In turn, though, Remainers have themselves been prone to re-emphasise this sense of a 
divided nation by depicting Leave voters as stupid racist bigots (e.g. “Greatbearlake” in 
comments section of Silverstone and Williams 2016) – a problematic projection designed to 
shame Leave voters, but one that overlooks the existence of other arguments for Brexit (e.g. 
the so-called Lexit position) beyond that of the caricature of parochial small-minded racist 
nationalism of much Remainer commentary. Indeed, such caricatures have also generated 
anxiety for many Brexit voters who find themselves denied due recognition of their own 
claims to subjectivity, and dismissed as racists instead. However, insofar as Remainers have 
embraced this binary then it has also manifested in a deep sense of shame about the country 
and even about one’s own nationality. As one Conservative MEP put it on gaining his newly-
applied for Irish passport, ‘I am quite ashamed to be British in many ways’ (quoted in 
McDonald 2017). Or as expressed by Wolfsz:  
 
‘I had thought there was an undercurrent of racism in society but did not imagine it was as great 
as this, or as intensely vile. I am now ashamed to admit [to] fellow Europeans that I am British 
as I now feel truly tainted by their truly awful decision’ (in comments section of Frostrup 2016). 
 
Remainers have therefore experienced Brexit as a betrayal of core British values, with this 
accompanied by a loss of trust in fellow citizens now viewed in disparaging terms. For this 
group of Remainers the sanctity of ‘home’ and of vicarious identification with the nation as a 
source of ontological security enhancement has become deeply tainted. Indeed, this mixed 
sense of distrust and disgust has even affected people’s closest family and personal 
relationships, which in some cases have fundamentally broken down. For instance, a survey 
conducted by the relationship and counselling charity, Relate, found that one-fifth of their 
300 relationship support counsellors were working with clients arguing over Brexit (Marsh 
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2017b). Others, meanwhile, are adamant that they could not have a relationship with a Brexit 
supporter, let alone start a family with one, while others suggest even friendship is an unlikely 
possibility (see comments section to Frostrup 2016). Similarly, in light of the referendum 
vote’s generational divide there are also cases of children struggling to maintain civil relations 
with their parents/grandparents.7 Brexit, therefore, has clearly been experienced at a deeply 
ontological level and not viewed merely as a political issue. Indeed, the fact that Brexit cut 
across lines of political party affiliation is perhaps one further indicator of this.  
 
Furthermore, insofar as Remainers view Brexit voters as ‘the biggest traitors this country has 
seen’ (“Havingalavrov” in comments section to Frostrup 2016) then elements of securitising 
anxieties about self-identity and the unknown nature of the future into identifiable objects of 
blame and fear (i.e. Brexit voters), is also apparent. Such a securitising move arguably serves 
to re-instantiate a sense of order in what is experienced as a new chaotic situation. In such 
discussion we therefore see how core relationships and narratives of self-identity are being 
realigned and where new certainties can be derived from positioning the self against those 
others who Remainers feel let down and betrayed by. Of course, not all Remainers experience 
these sentiments in the same way or with the same intensity. For instance, many Remainers 
are keen to distinguish between a mass of largely ignorant and gullible Brexit voters and the 
outright scoundrels whose ‘bullshit’ they swallowed.8 In such a framing, though, while the 
masses are redeemable, they also remain disrespected and a potential source of future 
dangers. 
 
Fundamentally important, however, is how the above points to the rupture of relationships 
within the British polity – a country experiencing what Lupovici (2012) calls a fundamental 
                                                          
7 To give one example: ‘I’m in a similarly awful position but with my family. I was for Remain and they for 
Brexit. I have no problem with having different political allegiance being a centrist myself but this is so much 
more. Even six weeks on I am full of pain and anger at the decision but worse I can't see my family the same 
way. They are diminished in my eyes and since I 'can't get over it and see that blood is thicker than water' as 
my Mum would like I now don't see them. I respect their right to choose but they can't seem to accept my 
right to be disgusted by the choice they made. I am now dealing with awful consequences of the vote at work 
which I can't discuss with them. I wish so much that I could just see them as they once were and keep hold of 
the love they deserve but for me it's changed everything. It's making me utterly wretched and they are 
bemused and impatient. It's destroyed something I don't think we'll ever recover. I hope I'm wrong but it feels 
like a permanent break’ (“346cmt” in comments section to Frostrup 2016).   
8 Interestingly both positions can sometimes be identified in single posts, thereby suggesting that the 
distinction is often blurred in people’s minds (see “Havingalavrov” in comments section to Frostrup 2016). 
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sense of ontological dissonance riven by clashing and apparently irreconcilable identity 
narratives. Indeed, with the securitisation and the reduction of political life down to two 
caricatured and mutually opposed identities, there is even a question as to whether the very 
notion that Remainers and Leavers inhabit the same polity is breaking down. In short, there 
is a break-down of social trust – something obviously also fostered by the ‘post-truth’ nature 
of the referendum campaign (particularly evident in the Leave campaign) in which each side 
accused the other of lies and manipulation. This environment is one where a mutually 
reinforcing spiral of ontological insecurity (Lupovici draft) cannot be discounted and prospects 
for a more informed debate on the post-Brexit situation that escapes reducing the issue down 
to mutually opposing discourses of identity becomes increasingly difficult. 
 
British Minorities 
Before discussing non-British residents, it is also important to consider one group of British 
citizens for whom the Brexit vote has raised a rather particular set of ontological anxieties. 
This concerns racial, ethnic and religious minorities – a notable number of whom actually 
voted for Brexit9 – but also the LGBT community. Irrespective of voting preference many 
people within these categories have evidently had very disorienting and disturbing 
experiences following the Brexit vote. Thus, while many Remainers have felt that their 
identification with their homeland has become tainted – with some even considering trading 
in their British citizenship because of how Brexit is seen as refuting core British/European 
values – many people in minority groups have become anxious that ‘home’ has become 
decidedly unsafe and unwelcoming. 
 
Following the referendum reports of racist physical and verbal attacks rose noticeably,10 as 
did those against the LGBT community (Weber 2016), as did reporting of them – an important 
point that has also likely served to generate anxieties. However, the implicitly racist nature of 
aspects of the Leave campaign has clearly fed into this.11 While these developments have also 
directly affected non-British residents (see below), for this group of British nationals Brexit 
                                                          
9 According to one poll 50-60% of Christian, Jewish, White and Sikh groups voted for Brexit, whereas less than 
35% of Mixed Race, Asian, Muslim, Chinese, Hindu and Black groups voted that way (Lambert 2016). 
10 The Home Office reported a 41% increase in racially and religiously aggravated offences between July 2015 
and July 2016 (Corcoran and Smith 2016, p. 1). 
11 On the integral link between racism and homophobia see (Weber 2016). 
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has often been experienced in quite distinct terms. Like non-British foreign residents their 
experiences have often been very direct and intimate at street level, such as in the case of 
the actor Colin Appleby, who reported hearing the following ditty in Covent Garden days after 
the referendum: “Rule Britannia / Britannia rules the waves / First we’ll get the Poles out, 
then the gays” (quoted in Weber 2016). Or the black woman and her daughter who were 
yelled at to ‘Go home n*****s, we just voted you out!’ (Alake 2016). However, for this group 
Brexit has not only been experienced as legitimising other people openly (and often 
aggressively) questioning their rights of residence, but questioning their very identification as 
British citizens. In short, visible racial, ethnic and religious attributes and markers (or, as 
experienced within the LGBT community, other apparent markers of ‘difference’) have 
become reason enough for their national identity and citizenship to be challenged and 
disparaged. 
 
At stake here is whether fellow citizens deem their citizenship legitimate – i.e. as even 
belonging to the we – or as conferring equal status as subjects sharing equal rights. Arguably 
two elements of subjectivity are embedded in this discussion that are relevant to ontological 
security. First, at an abstract level the ontological security literature generally assumes that a 
person’s sense of ontological security is intimately bound up with inter-subjectivity and 
recognition dynamics. A person’s subjectivity is never pre-given, but emerges in interaction 
with others and is something that needs to be continually claimed, articulated and performed 
(Browning and Joenniemi 2017, pp. 41-2). The ontological security of individuals, Giddens 
(1991, pp. 38, 45) argues, is therefore fatefully linked to ‘the appraisals of others’, with 
positive appraisals central to generating a sense of self-esteem, confidence and ontological 
security. Positive appraisals, however, are often dependent upon meeting contextually 
relevant criteria, with individuals failing to meet that criteria at risk of feeling shamed, 
inadequate, lacking a sense of belonging and home and therefore potentially ontologically 
insecure (Giddens 1991, pp. 65, 68; Noble 2005, pp. 114-5).  
 
At this point a second set of more historical factors becomes relevant. In this respect, the 
questioning of various minorities rights of belonging in the context of Brexit cannot be 
divorced from histories of British colonialism and the British Empire’s racialised treatment of 
its colonial peoples, not only as the Crown’s subjects, but frequently as lacking full and equal 
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subjectivity as human beings worthy of equal, fair and respectful treatment. Such anxieties 
have clearly been apparent after Brexit.  
 
‘My British children are dual-heritage White British and West African and they all have Yoruba 
middle names. My British wife and I want them to take pride in both cultures to which they 
belong. Now I am wondering what prejudice those names may cause on a job application’ 
(“Oportoman” in comments section to Lusher 2016). 
 
The question that arises for minorities is therefore whether they are being viewed likewise by 
many of their fellow British citizens. While racist groups in British society have always viewed 
minorities in such terms, the general presumption of recent decades has been that Britain is 
becoming an increasingly multicultural and cosmopolitan nation. Brexit has been experienced 
by many as suggesting this was just an illusion. Indeed, during the referendum campaign – 
almost overwhelming elements of which became focused on issues of immigration12 – in a 
manifestation of almost ‘postcolonial melancholia’ (Gilroy 2005) multiculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism were expressly targeted as an imposition on an unwilling country by a 
metropolitan liberal elite. Brexit, for many, was about ‘taking our country back’, from 
Brussels, from foreigners and (also often) from minorities – who while legal citizens have 
increasingly felt that this status was being implicitly challenged. 
 
Foreign Residents (EU nationals) 
 
“I live in constant uncertainty and dread. Like many others, I feel like I’ve invested my entire 
adulthood into this country… Since 23 June, suddenly I find myself explaining to people that I’ve 
never taken a penny in benefits and dread what might happen if someone listens carefully to my 
accent. It’s become OK for people to say things like ‘Oh, don’t worry, this isn’t about you, you’re 
basically British anyway’ or ‘you’re married to a British man, so they’re not going to kick you out’ 
as though I should be ashamed of who I am in reality, or hide behind my whiteness, and my 
ability to speak English well enough to ‘pass’ if I don’t say too much, or if I’m not listened to too 
carefully. As though being married to a British man could possibly shield me from deportation” 
                                                          
12 Infamously, Nigel Farage unveiled a poster depicting a long line of dark skinned refugees and migrants with 
the slogan ‘Breaking Point: the EU has failed us all’. For many this highlighted the racialized and inflammatory 
nature of the campaign (Stewart and Mason 2016). 
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(Sylvie Kilford, Polish, PhD student, quoted in O’Carroll 2016). 
 
The second group of people this article considers is foreign non-nationals resident in the UK, 
with a particular focus on EU citizens. Unlike British citizens, foreign nationals without 
citizenship rights were all ineligible to vote in the referendum. This is important as there was 
considerable prior discussion on whether they should be accorded voting rights. Their 
disenfranchisement as such signalled society’s designation of them as ‘different’ and not fully 
‘us’. It is also important because in most cases this involved people who had been resident in 
the UK for some years (often for decades). These are people who had come to the UK for 
work, education or family reasons, who had got jobs, established businesses, bought houses, 
and raised families and had decided to make the UK their home, cultivating their primary 
community and friendship groups there. In respect of EU citizens, they are also people who, 
in general, had felt no particular need to apply for British citizenship. 
 
There may be various reasons for this. Some, of course, may never have felt any emotional 
affinity to Britain. In many cases, it was not necessarily a question of affinity, but rather that 
they had just never got round to it, since their European citizenship meant this was not a 
pressing concern. It might also be that as EU citizens they felt that their rights were protected 
anyway. British citizenship, therefore, would not make any particular material difference to 
their lives. However, while various rationalist-based explanations like this last one can be 
posited, this misses more idealistic explanations connected to a particular cosmological (and 
inherently cosmopolitan) view about the idea of Europe and European identity. This has been 
evident in many people’s reactions following the referendum. To note two: 
 
‘I see myself as European, perhaps more so than Swedish. The European label and the EU is for 
me intimately connected due to what it represents and its closeness to the ideals I assume to 
be connected with the continent. This is perhaps more connected to my ideals than anything 
else’ (Falk 2016). 
 
‘It’s bizarre that it came to this,’ said Marius, a 28-year-old from Germany. ‘I don’t see any 
benefit, any benefit at all. All the things we believe in, the project of coming together… it’s taken 
a big hit. I don’t understand the anger’ (Quoted in Williams 2016). 
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From this standpoint national citizenship is simply less salient than European citizenship as an 
identity marker. Entailed here are not just questions of identity but a broader cosmological 
view about the nature and direction of travel of European (geo)politics, one that received a 
rather abrupt shock when the referendum result was announced and can be seen in the sense 
of confusion evident in the second quote. 
  
As with other Remainers the referendum result generated a sense of shock and dislocation 
for many of this group. This seems to have been focused around several deeply interwoven 
dimensions in which ontological security enhancing practices have been destabilised. Not 
least, Brexit signified for many EU nationals that (many in) Britain did not want them there 
any longer and that they should ‘go home’. But this raised deep existential anxieties as to 
what exactly was this ‘home’ of which the Leavers speak? For many EU nationals Britain is 
home and many expressed that their countries of origin, while home in some national sense, 
were no longer really home in a personal sense. They were, in short, feeling pressured into 
returning to places where many now lacked connections, community, housing etc… 
 
‘Maybe I need a plan B for my life. As hard as it seems, I’m a Londoner. I have no idea what’s 
happening in France. This is home’. (Marie, 26, from France, quoted in Williams 2016). 
 
‘German, here for 26 years, if things get difficult in London, I’ll check out Scotland or otherwise 
Ireland, Germany is a foreign country to me now and I would only go there if I was old/seriously 
ill/could not find a job anywhere else’.13 
 
‘I feel a little bit frightened that one day the government is just gonna kick me out of the country 
and make me go back to Latvia where I don’t have any means to exist and don’t have home left 
or people who can support me. This means that to return to Latvia is to me to become homeless 
there’ (Kirils Petrov, Latvian, Divided Kingdom Brexit Documentary 2016). 
 
                                                          
13 J.B. Evans comment on the Facebook group EU immigrant Brexit survival, 27 June 2016, 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/540396686153880/?ref=notif&notif_t=group_r2j_approved&notif_id=148
0325462119132 
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For some EU nationals, therefore, Brexit has fundamentally challenged the concept of home, 
with this placing them psychologically in a heightened sense of uncertainty and anxiety. 
Interestingly, however, for other foreign nationals Brexit has generated a different response, 
with their sense of non-British nationhood actually growing stronger as they reconnect with 
a different national home in order to re-establish markers of certainty and safety.14 
 
Anxieties about losing ‘home’, however, are experienced in the raw and very directly. Multiple 
examples exist of EU citizens (including children) being aggressively confronted and told ‘to 
go home’. One Polish man was even killed following an assault apparently motivated by 
nothing more than a group of youths overhearing him speaking Polish (Quinn 2016).15 In the 
Cambridgeshire town of Huntingdon, for instance, laminated cards stating “Leave the EU. No 
more Polish vermin” were distributed the morning after the vote (Lusher 2016). As one 35-
year-old Polish woman noted, ‘Last week, a man at work called me a f***ing foreigner, made 
comments about foreigners taking benefits. Before the referendum, people tried to be nice, 
tried not to let it show. Now, some of them don’t even try. You see it in their faces’ (quoted 
in Lusher 2016). As a French EU national noted, ‘These people have no idea of the 
psychological harm they have inflicted upon us’ (“Vive Laz Republique” in comments section 
to Younge 2016). 
 
Central to the anxieties generated in such interactions is obviously a loss of acceptance, a 
sense of rejection, and perhaps even more destabilising, a loss of social trust in one’s 
immediate neighbours and community. People therefore report walking down the street 
‘looking at people and thinking: “Was it you who voted out? Was it you who voted out? Was 
it you who voted out…’ (quoted in Younge 2016). Suspicious and nervous of those closest 
around her, Linda, a 36 year old who came to the UK from the Czech Republic sixteen years 
ago, expressed that she wanted  ‘to see everybody’s vote on them’ branded like a tattoo 
(Williams 2016). There are clearly elements of a ‘shaming strategy’ (Steele 2005) evident in 
this last sentiment, of trying to get people to visibly confront what they have done. However, 
                                                          
14 “Interestingly, I am feeling more French than ever since the referendum” (Charles Noblet quoted in O’Carroll 
2016). 
15 Whether or not the motive was Brexit related, the important point is that this is how it was widely perceived 
across society, thereby further enhancing the anxieties of foreign nationals. 
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this desire to be able to explicitly identify who is to blame also resonates with wanting to 
know who has betrayed you in your community and around whom you might feel nervous or 
safe. Of course, the fact that some Leave voters have seen Brexit as legitimating open hostility 
towards foreigners suggests they have no problem with being openly identifiable and feel no 
shame. 
 
Frightened and anxious, however, many EU nationals report changing their everyday routines. 
As reported by one Polish woman, her and her partner have started doing their shopping in 
neighbouring towns, instead of their home town of Boston, the place which recorded the 
highest percentage leave vote (75%). Her anxieties are plain: ‘you can’t ask your husband one 
question in your own language, because someone will look at you like: “I want to kill you”’ 
(quoted in Lusher 2016). Others report changing their normal patterns of social 
communication, including trying to talk ‘as little as possible, so the British people will not 
notice my accent’ (Divided Kingdom Brexit Documentary 2016; O’Carroll 2016), or refusing to 
speak with people they previously regarded as friends.  
 
Unlike British nationals from minority groups the anxieties of EU foreign nationals are not 
connected to whether or not one is viewed as a (full) British citizen, but rather to whether 
one’s EU citizenship is any longer accorded the same level of respect and equality it was prior 
to the referendum. In practical terms, however, the above discussion has also pointed to 
notable similarities, not least regarding anxieties about home and belonging and whether one 
is any longer deemed to be a subject (a human) of equal worth and value. Insofar as EU foreign 
nationals find themselves depicted as vermin then this is clearly in question. 
 
This last point is interesting because there is also evidence of some EU nationals drawing 
distinctions within and between different members of this group as a form of diversionary 
tactics and ontological security enhancement. Rather than rejecting the stigmatisations 
frequently assigned to immigrants in debates over Brexit, they side with them, but emphasise 
that they do not apply to them personally. For example, as stated by one Polish resident in 
Bradford, ‘I don’t like when Polish people get benefits, they’re not working. I came here for 
work, I’m working hard to get this money, it’s not like I’m cheating or something’ 
(MyBradford.org 2016). Likewise, it is also possible to identify a tendency amongst more 
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educated European citizens, particularly those studying in the UK or with professional jobs, of 
distinguishing themselves from those in search of more menial labour. In this it is therefore 
possible to see the transposing of anxieties about their own belonging in the UK (now being 
questioned by Brexit) onto a blaming/securitisation of other European citizens deemed to be 
the (justified) cause of resentment amongst the British population. Such an attempt to deflect 
criticism and approbation therefore seeks to close the gap with British citizens by emphasising 
we are good and worthy too, while opening a gap of stigmatisation with other EU nationals.16 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The article has focused on showing how the Brexit referendum result for Britain to leave the 
EU has been a cause of considerable anxiety and ontological insecurity for Remain supporters. 
Before drawing some general conclusions it is important to recognise that this offers just one 
side of the story. If the referendum result has been a considerable source of ontological 
insecurity for some, for many others – and certainly for many Brexiteers – it has been 
experienced as deeply ontologically affirming, at least in the short-term. Indeed, one of the 
most notable things about the referendum is how a single vote became the focus of such 
significant levels of anguish and aspiration on all sides. For many Leavers the vote has been a 
valedictory and cathartic experience, one signifying their reclaiming of a sense of subjectivity 
they have long felt denied to them. Many subsequent expressions of this have certainly been 
crude, distasteful and often cruel, but claims to regain sovereignty, to take back control of the 
country’s borders, and openly expressed (and often racist) desires for immigrants to be sent 
packing, can themselves be seen as a backlash built upon the often precarious and alienating 
experiences that many people voting Leave experience in their everyday lives (Mckenzie 
2017).17 In this respect, the idea that Brexit signified the masses rising up against the 
metropolitan liberal ruling elite, though a simplification, does capture core elements of 
                                                          
16 Thanks to Aiste Jotautyte for highlighting this dynamic. 
17 Although in actuality Leave voters were more likely to be middle class than poor (Bhambra 2017, p. 217). 
Whether such people felt they were poor – in light of British politicians’ frequent appeals to the ‘strivers’ and 
the ‘just managing’ – is an interesting question. 
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prevailing sentiment. Of course, whether Brexit will offer a longer-term source of ontological 
security for many of these people is open to question. 
 
In contrast, of course, this article has focused (mainly) on the experiences of Remain 
supporters. Drawing on the literature on ontological security it first noted that existential 
anxieties can take different forms, distinguishing between anxieties of fate and death, 
emptiness and meaninglessness and of guilt and condemnation. It then outlined several 
processes and mechanisms through which individuals typically seek to enhance or preserve a 
sense of ontological security. These included the need: to develop consistent and stable 
biographical narratives of self-identity; to develop routinized patterns of everyday behaviour 
that serve to re-inscribe those self-narratives; to vicariously identify with broader 
communities; to establish a place of sanctuary and safety called ‘home’; to avoid behaviours 
and accusations that can generate a sense of shame and moral self-approbation; and finally, 
the tendency to transpose anxieties about the unknown onto identifiable objects of fear and 
blame around which new narratives of social order can be developed.  
 
The following analysis then argued that the Brexit referendum and its aftermath have 
generated slightly different sorts of ontological anxieties for different groups of Remainers. 
Although the analysis obviously provides a simplified and flattened out account, ontological 
anxieties around Brexit do seem to have different manifestations and tones. For instance, for 
British citizens who voted remain, Brexit was experienced by many as a form of bereavement 
at the loss it signified of core elements of self-identity and fundamental values. This has been 
accompanied by a sense of embarrassment and shame at what Britain is seen to have done 
to Europe, but also a deep sense of betrayal targeted at Leave voters who are seen as seeking 
to fundamentally transform the nature of Britain and Britishness. In this respect, Brexit has 
challenged established cosmological systems of meaning regarding what Britain is and what 
its place and role in the world should be, while simultaneously activating anxieties of guilt and 
condemnation. However, it was also noted that British citizens from minority backgrounds 
have sometimes experienced a slightly different set of anxieties, with the rise of racist anti-
immigrant sentiment raising fundamental concerns about their very status as British citizens 
and that become manifest in anxieties as to whether one is even recognised as an equal 
worthy of belonging. 
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In contrast, for EU nationals ontological anxieties have emerged for slightly different reasons. 
While many also felt challenged at the cosmological level in terms of Brexit challenging 
established systems of meaning about the nature of Europe and the direction of European 
history, unlike British citizens they did not stand to lose their European citizenship or sense of 
identity – indeed, this rather seems to have been reaffirmed. Rather, at stake for them has 
been the question of the status of European citizenship in a post-Brexit referendum world, 
and where being a European resident has become increasingly stigmatised and a source of 
resentment. In all cases, however, ontological anxieties generated by Brexit have also been 
manifest in the disruption of existing routines and patterns of everyday behaviour and their 
replacement with new routines, with new narratives of self-identity being carved out, often 
premised on securitising moves that have sought to re-inscribe a new sense of order onto 
what is perceived to be a chaotic situation. 
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